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Abstract
We model the entry and expansion of KFC and McDonalds in Chinese cities as a dynamic
game. We assume that the observed entry and expansion decisions are equilibrium out-
comes. This allows us to recover the structural parameters of the game without solving for
equilibrium. We use the estimated model to study the entry- and sunk-cost spillovers from
the rival. Our estimates suggest substantial spillovers to the cost of entering a new city.
For example, if the rival is not present in the city in which the chain is entering and the
distance from the nearest city where the rival is present decreases by 100 kilometers, the
cost of entry into the city decreases by 1.22 standard deviations for KFC and 1.52 standard
deviations for McDonalds. If the rival is already present in the city, a one-unit increase
in the number of rivals outlets decreases the cost of entry by 0.59 standard deviations for
McDonalds but increases it by 1.49 standard deviations for KFC. We also nd that the
spillovers to the sunk cost of opening a new outlet are much smaller. Hence the expansion
within a city is not as much inuenced by the presence of the rival as is the entry into a
new city.
Keywords: Dynamic Games; Dynamic Entry ; Fastfood Industry; China
JEL Codes: L13; L81; M31
1 Introduction
The decisions about market selection are at the heart of the growth strategy of any business.1
In this paper, we study the empirical relationship between market structure and, entry
and expansion decisions of retail chains. We dene market structure broadly to include a
chains own network of outlets, its rivalsnetwork of outlets and some other market-specic
characteristics. Our primary objective is to study how the rivalspresence in and around a
market a¤ects a chains entry and expansion decisions.2 Our empirical setting is the entry
and expansion of Western fastfood chains in various Chinese cities3 over a period of two
decades. Due to the lack of data on the demand side, we focus on spillovers to the cost of
entering a new market and to the sunk cost of expansion within an existing market.
First consider a chains decision to enter a new city. If we take the demand side as given,
the rivalspresence in or around the city may increase or decrease the chains perceived cost
of entry. Next consider a chains decision to expand within a city by opening more outlets.
Once again taking the demand side as given, the rivalspresence may increase or decrease
the the sunk cost of opening new outlets. The entry and sunk costs are economic costs and
not directly observable. We need a structural model to recover them from the data. If we
model these costs as functions of the size and the density of the rivalsnetwork of outlets,
we can quantify the cost-side spillovers from the rival. This is the approach that we take in
this paper.4
The spillovers from the rivals are not the only consideration when a multi-outlet chain
contemplates entry into a new market or expansion within an existing market. The spillovers
from own network of outlets are equally, or perhaps more, important. When a chain con-
siders entry into a new market, the proximity of the market to the chains own existing
network of outlets is likely to reduce the cost of entry due to the economies of density. Once
in the market, further expansion may also benet from own presence in the market. On
top of the e¤ects from own and rivalsnetworks, market-specic charateristics also play an
important role in entry and expansion decisions. These characteristics may include market
demographics and per capita income of the consumers.
We attempt to quantify these multiple e¤ects in the context of entry and expansion of
1 In a recent video interview, McKinsey & Companys Chris Bradly (a principal in McKinseys Sydney
o¢ ce) said: If you look at what drives the growth of companies, it turns out that selection at a micromarket
level is much more important than trying to gain market share. In fact, 80 percent of growth is explained
by decisions about where to compete or by market selection. [The video interview is available at http:
//www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/the_art_of_strategy (last accessed: November 2, 2013)]
2 In this paper, entryrefers to the decision of opening the rst outlet in a market and expansionrefers
to the decision of adding more outlets to a market conditional on entry.
3We dene market to be a city and hence use the words marketand city interchangeably.
4Two important caveats apply: 1) although our approach allows us to recover the net spillovers from the
rivals, it cannot disentangle the positive and negative spillovers; 2) although our model allows us to quantify
the entry and sunk costs it cannot explain what exactly these costs are and how the rivalspresence actually
a¤ects them.
1
two major Western fastfood chains, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) and McDonalds, into
various Chinese cities. The rapid expansion of the two chains into numerous Chinese cities
within the last couple of decades provides a unique opportunity to study their entry and
expansion decisions in a strategic environment. Because entry and expansion are inherently
dynamic decisions, we specify and estimate a dynamic game of entry and expansion to
understand these decisions.5 In our model, every period, for each market, the two chains
simultaneously decide whether to enter the market (if they are not in yet) or to expand
the number of outlets in the market. Their decisions depend on: 1) their overall expansion
policy in the country; 2) their own network of outlets in the market and in the neighboring
markets; 3) their rivals network in the market and in the neighboring markets; 4) various
characteristics of the market; 5) their expectations of their rivals entry and expansion
decisions; and 6) their expectations about the future evolution of the market characteristics.
The estimation of such a large scale game was almost inconceivable until very recently.
The full-solution methods, like Rusts Nested-Fixed-Point Algorithm [Rust (1987)], are not
feasible for a game of this scale because they require computation of equilibrium at every
iteration of the estimation process. For a game like the one that we specify in this paper,
the enormity of the state space makes it practically impossible to compute equilibrium even
once.6 Recently a number of authors have proposed methods to estimate dynamic games
without computing equilibrium. In this paper we use the method proposed by Bajari et al.
(2007). The principal advantage of their approach is its relatively lower computational
burden.
We nd evidence of substantial spillovers from the rival to the cost of entering a new
city. For example, if the rival is not present in the city in which the chain is entering and
the distance from the nearest city where the rival is present decreases by 100 kilometers, the
cost of entry into the city decreases by 1.22 standard deviations for KFC and 1.52 standard
deviations for McDonalds. If the rival is already present in the city, a one-unit increase
in the number of rivals outlets decreases the cost of entry by 0.51 standard deviations for
McDonalds but increases it by 1.49 standard deviations for KFC.
We also nd that the spillovers to the sunk cost of opening a new outlet are much
smaller. For example, a 10-unit increase in the rivals network density (to be dened later)
decreases the sunk cost by 0.03 standard deviations for KFC and increases it by 0.03 stan-
5Entry into a new city is a dynamic decision because a chain can either enter now or wait until the next
period. If it enters now, it will have to pay the cost of entry and will start receiving prots from the new
outlets in the next period. If it waits, it will face the same choice, enter or wait, next period.
Similarly, expansion within a city is also a dynamic decision because a chain can either expand now or
wait until the next period. If it expands now, it will have to pay the sunk cost for every new outlet that it
opens and it will start getting the prots from the new outlets next period. If it decides to wait, it will face
the same choice, expand or wait, next period.
6There are 11 state variables for each chain in our model (see Section 3 for details). These include 2
privately observed cost shocks. Even if we assumed just 5 possible values for each of these shocks, the
number of states in the state space would still be a whopping 9.29E+15.
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dard deviations for McDonalds. Similarly, the number of rivals outlets in the city also
has a small e¤ect on the sunk cost: a one-unit increase in the rivals number of outlets
decreases the sunk cost by 0.01 standard deviations for both KFC and McDonalds. Hence
the expansion within a city is not as much inuenced by the presence of the rival as is the
entry into a new city.
This paper connects to a number of literatures. Firstly, it is closely related to the liter-
ature on empirical models of entry [Berry and Reiss (2007)]. The pioneering papers in this
literature are Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992). Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006)
and Zhu et al. (2009) extend the framework to endogenously consider product di¤erentia-
tion along with entry decisions in static game-theoretic environments. We contribute to this
literature by using a dynamic-game framework to study the relationship between market
structure and the rmsentry and expansion decisions.
Secondly, and most importantly, it is related to the empirical literature on retail chain
entry and expansion. This literature can be classied into three groups depending on
whether the underlying model is static or dynamic and whether it allows for strategic
interactions among the rms.
The rst group includes papers that model entry as a static game. Notable papers in this
group are: Toivanen and Waterson (2005), Jia (2008) and Nishida (2013). Toivanen and
Waterson (2005) allow for a positive e¤ect from the rival in a chains market entry decision
using data from the United Kingdoms fastfood industry. They model the duoploy between
Burger King and McDonalds as a static sequential game. Their structural estimates suggest
that a rivals presence in the market leads a rm to expect a larger market. They argue
that the spillover e¤ect mainly operates through learning. Jia (2008) studies the positive
spillover e¤ects when locating multiple stores in nearby regions in the context of Wal-
Marts market entry decisions. Her modelling strategy involves a static three-stage game.
Nishida (2013) extends Jias approach to consider the decision of how many stores to open
in a chains entry decision using data from the convenience-store industry of Japan, but
constrains the spillover e¤ect to be positive as in Jia (2008). The aforementioned papers
build on game-theoretic models of static entry.
The second group consists of papers that employ single-agent dynamic models to study a
chains location and expansion decisions. Notable contributions in this vein of literature are
Holmes (2011) and Toivanen and Waterson (2011). Holmes (2011) estimates the economies
of density in the store location decisions of Wal-Mart in the United States. He considers
cannibalization of sales by nearby stores of the same chain but does not model competition
e¤ect from other retail chains. He nds that the economies of density are substantial
and extend beyond the savings in trucking costs. Toivanen and Waterson (2011) study
the expansion of McDonalds in the United Kingdom up to 1990, a period when it can
reasonably be considered a monopoly in the UK market. They nd positive cannibalization
e¤ect from own outlets on the demand side but economies of density on the cost side.
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The third group includes papers that model entry and expansion as dynamic games.
Important contributions to this strand of literature are Aguirregabiria and Magesan (2012)
and Yang (2012). Aguirregabiria and Magesan (2012) use the dataset in Toivanen and
Waterson (2005). Their main empirical contribution is to show that when a chains beliefs
about its rivals strategy are biased, the chain runs the risk of underestimating the potential
competition e¤ects from the rival after its own entry. Yang (2012) studies the e¤ect of
information spillovers from incumbent rivals on a chains decision to enter a new market.
Prior to entry, potential entrants are uncertain about the size of the market that they are
about to enter. The past entry and exit decisions of incumbent rivals reduce this uncertainty
and allow the potential entrants to make more informed entry decisions. The present paper
is closest to Yang (2012) as both papers estimate dynamic games to quantify the spillovers
from rivals. However, this paper di¤ers from his in a number of ways. First, we focus
on entry and expansion decisions of the chains while his focus is on binary entry and exit
decisions. Second, we allow for multiple spillover e¤ects within the chain and across the
chains while he focuses solely on information spillovers from rivals. Third, we explicitly
model the e¤ect of own network on entry while he abstracts away from this e¤ect. Fourth,
our empirical setting is the fastfood market in China while he studies the Canadian fastfood
market.
Thirdly and nally, this paper provides yet another application of the recent methods
to estimate dynamic games. The leading methodology papers in this literature are Aguir-
regabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari et al. (2007), Pakes et al. (2007) and Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Ackerberg et al. (2007) provide a comparison of these methods.
We have organized the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview
of the Chinese fastfood industry and introduce our dataset. In Section 3 we present our
model. In Section 4 we discuss our estimation strategy. We report the estimation results in
Section 5. We discuss the evidence on spillovers in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide an overview of the history of Western chains in the Chinese
fastfood market and introduce our dataset. The discussion in this section draws mainly on
Shen and Xiao (2013).
2.1 Industry Overview
The history of Western fastfood in China began in November 1987 when KFC opened its
rst outlet in Beijing. Three years later, in October 1990, McDonalds opened its rst outlet
in Shenzhen and the competition between the two formally started in the worlds largest
emerging market.
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In Figure 1 we plot the total number of outlets and their growth rates in China for the
two chains during the period from 1990 to 2007. Although globally McDonalds is far ahead
of KFC in terms of number of outlets, their positions are reversed in the Chinese market.
Not only did KFC enter the country rst, its expansion has also been much faster than
that of McDonalds. By the end of 2007, KFC had close to two thousand outlets in China
whereas McDonalds had slightly more than a thousand.
In Table 1 we report, for selected years, the total number of outlets together with the
number of cities entered by each chain. The rst thing to note is that although KFC has
been ahead of McDonalds throughout the period, it has extended its lead very sharply since
2000. The second thing to note is that most of the KFCs lead is due to its entry in more
cities. By 2007, McDonalds had entered 142 cities (out of the total 246 in our sample)
whereas KFC was present in 230 cities, a lead of 62%. If we compare within city density of
outlets, McDonalds had 7.1 outlets per city while KFC had 8.4, a lead of 18%. The third
thing to note is that the scale of entry and expansion varies over the sample period. This
variation will be helpful to identify the parameters of interest.
Table 2, in which we report statistics about the rst mover in each city, provides further
evidence that KFC has been much more aggressive than McDonalds in entering new cities.
By the end of 2007, at least one of the two chains was present in 236 cities. KFC was the
rst mover in 177 (75%) of these cities and McDonalds in 33 (14%). In the remaining 26
(11%) cities, both chains entered in the same calendar year. On the average, McDonalds
waited 3.5 years to enter a city where KFC was already present.
We model the entry and expansion of the Western fastfood chains in the Chinese market
over the 1990-2007 period as a duopoly game between KFC and McDonalds.7 Although
lately some other Western fastfood chains have entered the Chinese market, their presence is
still modest by the end of our sample period.8 Similarly, none of the local Chinese fastfood
chains is large enough to be considered a strategic player in the national fastfood market.
Also, the Western fastfood is quite distinct from the traditional Chinese fastfood and hence
the two are not likely to be close substitutes.
We do not distinguish between the franchised and non-franchised outlets. There are
at least two reasons for doing so. First, during our sample period the franchised outlets
accounted for a small percentage of the total for both chains.9 Second, our focus in this
7 It is a popular perception that KFC and McDonalds are close rivals in the Chinese market. For example,
The Wall Street Journal Asia reported on February 29, 2012: McDonalds Corp. is launching a new ad
campaign in China ... to win market share from its dominant rival, Yum Brands Inc.s KFC. [p. 19]
8For example, Subway entered the Chinese market in 1995 but had only around 150 outlets by the end
of 2007. Burger King entered in 2005 and had fewer than 50 outlets by the end of 2007.
9KFC opened its rst franchised outlet in 2000 and by the end of 2005 it had only 37 franchised outlets,
which were 2.5% of its then total stock of 1462 outlets. (http://franchise.business-opportunities.
biz/2006/04/21/kfc-makes-it-easier-to-buy-a-franchise [last accessed: October 7, 2013]) McDonalds
launched a pilot franchise program in 2004 and had only 6 franchised outlets by early 2010. (http://www.
reuters.com/article/2010/05/06/us-mcdonalds-china-idUSTRE6451W420100506 [last accessed: March 1,
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paper is on entry and expansion decisions. These decisions are made by the top management
of the chains at the national level and franchisees have little say in them.
2.2 Data
Our basic unit of analysis is a city. Our sample consists of 246 Chinese cities spanning
an eighteen-year period from 1990 to 2007.10 Our dataset includes information on gross
domestic product (GDP), population and area of these cities. We have also gathered infor-
mation on geographic coordinates of the cities. This enables us to calculate the geographic
distance between any possible pair of cities in our sample. We track entry and expansion
of KFC and McDonalds in these cities for the entire sample period.11 In the rest of this
sub-section we highlight some important features of the dataset.
In Table 3 we show the frequency distribution of the number of outlets at the end of
the sample period. There are 16 cities (6:5% of total) in the sample in which KFC has yet
to enter and 104 cities (42:3%) in which McDonalds has yet to enter. The number of cities
with 1 or 2 KFC outlets is 131 (53:3%) and with 1 or 2 McDonalds outlets it is 89 (36:2%).
There are also a number of cities with a sizable presence by both chains. For example, there
are 39 cities (15:8%) with 11 or more KFC outlets and 23 cities (9:4%) with 11 or more
McDonalds outlets.
In the upper panel of Table 4 we show the frequency distribution of the number of
outlets for the entire sample. This information is important because the number of outlets
in a city is a key state variable in our model. There are many zeros in the data. Out of
a total number of 4; 428 observations (246 cities times 18 years), there are 3; 168 (71:5%)
observations with zero outlets for KFC and 3; 638 (82:2%) observations with zero outlets
for McDonalds. The number of observations with 1 or 2 outlets is 755 (17:1%) for KFC
and 466 (10:5%) for McDonalds. The number of observations with 11 or more outlets is
just 164 (3:7%) for KFC and 116 (2:6%) for McDonalds.
In the lower panel of Table 4 we show the frequency distribution of the new outlets
opened during a year. This is important because the choice of new outlets is the only de-
cision variable in our model.12 Here again we see lots of zeros. There are 3; 643 (82:3%)
observations with zero new outlets for KFC and 4; 018 (90:7%) such observations for Mc-
Donalds. When a chain does open new outlets, most of the time it opens either 1 or 2.
There are 594 (13:5%) observations with 1 or 2 new outlets for KFC and 295 (6:7%) such
observations for McDonalds. The rest of the observations (191 or 4:3% for KFC and 115
2013])
10According to the World Bank, total population of China was 1,318 million in 2007. Out of these, 45% or
593.1 million people lived in urban areas. Total population of the 246 cities in our sample was 336.5 million
in 2007. This amounts to 56.7% of total urban population in China in that year.
11For details on collection and construction of the dataset see Shen and Xiao (2013).
12We do not model entry and expansion decisions separately. Instead, we write a unied decision problem
that encompasses the two decisions. See Section 3 for details.
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or 2:6% for McDonalds) are with 3 or more new outlets.
In Table 5 we report summary statistics for a number of variables. Some of these
variables are chain-specic and some city-specic. The rst chain-specic variable is the
total number of outlets of a chain in a city at the beginning of a calendar year. The average
number of outlets is 1:8 for KFC and 1:2 for McDonalds. As we saw in Table 4, there is a
lot of variation in the number of outlets. This is reected in high standard deviations (SDs)
of the number of outlets: 8:8 for KFC and 6:3 for McDonalds.
The second chain-specic variable is the number of new outlets opened in a city during
a calendar year. The average number of new outlets is 0:4 for KFC (with a SD of 1:7) and
0:2 for McDonalds (with a SD of 1:1). A notable feature of this variable in the data is the
high frequency of zeros. Another notable feature is that the SD is many times higher than
the mean. Both these features will inuence our choice of the econometric model in the
rst stage of estimation below.
The third chain-specic variable is the distance from own nearest outlet. It is our
measure of distance from own network. It takes non-zero values only for the cities in which
the chain has yet to enter. This variable measures the geographic distance (in kilometers)
between the city in question and the nearest city with at least one own outlet. The average
distance from network is 327 kilometers for KFC (with a SD of 442 kilometers) and 647
kilometers for McDonalds (with a SD of 1; 095 kilometers).
The fourth chain-specic variable is the network density. We dene network density to
be the weighted number of own outlets within a 300-kilometer radius, where the weights
vary linearly and inversely with the distance. Specically, we dene the network density of
chain i in city c at time t as
wict =
X
kjdck300
nikt

1  dck
300

, (1)
where nikt is the number of chain is outlets in city k and dck is the geographic distance
between cities c and k. The sum is over all cities within a 300-kilometers radius of city
c.13 The average value of network density variable is 10:8 for KFC (with a SD of 24:0) and
7:9 for McDonalds (with a SD of 18:6). This network density variable is similar to the
one in Nishida (2013) except for two di¤erences: 1) while we add the number of outlets,
weighted by distance between the cities, he adds the number of markets; 2) while we count
the number of own outlets within a 300-kilometer radius, he counts the number of adjacent
markets with at least one own outlet.
The last two variables in Table 5 are city-specic. The rst is population density (in
units of thousands per square kilometer). The average population density is 1:21 with a
13We also constructed this variable with 100km, 200km, 400km, 500km and 600km radii. If wr denotes the
variable based on a radius of r kilometers, the correlations between w300 and

w100; w200; w400; w500; w600
	
are f0:98; 0:99; 0:98; 0:94; 0:90g for KFC and f0:99; 1:00; 1:00; 0:99; 0:99g for McDonalds. We use w300 as our
benchmark. The variants based on other radii give similar results.
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SD of 1:12. The second variable is the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in 2001
prices) in thousands of yuans. The average GDP per capita is Y14:8 thousand with a SD
of Y15:8 thousand.
In addition to the above, we have also collected data on city-level operating income.
These data are available from 2003 to 2007 for an unbalanced panel of cities . We summarize
these data in Table 6 and provide more details about them in Appendix A. The average
annual operating income per city for KFC is Y328.57 million (with a SD of Y489.83 million)
and for McDonalds it is Y83.04 million (with a SD of Y141.36 million). The average
annual income per outlet is Y17.91 million (SD=Y20.29 million) for KFC and Y9.26 million
(SD=Y5.44 million) for McDonalds.
3 Model
We have argued in Section 2.1 that KFC and McDonalds can reasonably be considered a
duopoly of foreign fastfood chains in the Chinese market over the sample period. Hence we
model their entry and expansion decisions as a dynamic duopoly game.14 Due to the data
constraint, we assume that the decisions to open new outlets are made at the city level.15
Instead, if we assumed that a chain chose the number and the locations of all its new outlets
in the country simultaneously at the national level, the problem would be similar to those
in Jia (2008) and Nishida (2013). The complexity of those problems is well known. Our
assumption makes an extremely large problem very tractable.16
The strategy of modeling the outlet opening decisions at the city level has its limitations.
First, fastfood chains generally decide expansion policies at the national level and then look
for suitable markets to implement the policies. We take care of this problem by introducing
the age of a chain as a state variable. This is motivated by the observation that both
KFC and McDonalds expanded very slowly during the rst few years after their entry into
the Chinese market. Later, after gaining some experience in the market, they expanded
rapidly. Second, the decisions to open new outlets in a city are likely to be a¤ected by own
(and possibly rivals) presence in the neighboring cities. In other words, we cannot assume
these markets to be isolated and independent of one another. We take care of this problem
by constructing two separate state variables for each chain: 1) distance from the nearest
14Our model does not feature exit from a city or a reduction in the number of outlets within a city. This
is because we do not observe exit or contraction in our sample. In our original dataset, we do not have
complete information on 39 KFC and 24 McDonalds outlets. Because these account for a small fraction
of the total number of outlets in the data and also there is no particular pattern for the missing data, we
exclude them from our sample. The outlets with missing information may include exits.
15We have 4428 city-year observations in our dataset. If we were to model the outlet opening decisions at
the national level, we would only have 18 yearly observations.
16The cardinality of the choice set for each chain in our model is just 51: a chain can open any number of
outlets from 0 to 50 in a city in one year. If we modelled the same problem at the national level, with 246
markets in our sample, the cardinality of the choice set for each chain would be 51246.
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city with at least one own outlet; and 2) network density.17 The rst variable is likely to
a¤ect the decision to enter a new city. A chain is more likely to enter a new city if it is
closer to its existing network of outlets [Holmes (2011)]. The second variable is likely to
have implications for the expansion decision. A denser network may have both positive and
negative e¤ects on a chains ability to expand further. An important simplifying assumption
of our model is that these variables (distance and network density) evolve exogenously and
we estimate their evolution from the data. When the chains make their entry and expansion
decisions, they take the evolution of these variables as given. We further discuss and justify
this assumption in Section 3.4.
In our model, time is discrete and planning horizon is innite. There are two fastfood
chains, i and j.18 Each period, for each of the C cities, they simultaneously choose the
number of outlets to open in the city. Although the chains make their decisions at the city
level, their decisions depend on the networks of own and rivals outlets in nearby cities and
also on their own expansion policy at the national level (see below). In the following, we
model the problem of chain i. Chain j solves a similar problem.
3.1 Choice and State Variables
The choice variable for chain i is xi 2 f0; 1; : : : ; xg, where x is the maximum number of
outlets that a chain can open in a city in one period. The length of a period is one year. The
state variables are: 1) nic 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng, number of own outlets in city c at the beginning
of the period; 2) njc 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng, number of rivals outlets in the city at the beginning of
the period; 3) ai 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ag, age of the chain in the country; 4) dic 2 D, distance from
the nearest city with at least one own outlet; 5) djc 2 D, distance from the nearest city
with at least one rival outlet; 6) wic 2W , own network density;7) wjc 2W , rivals network
density; 8) zc, a vector of city characteristics; 9) "eic, a privately observed random shock
to the cost of entering a new market; and 10) "sic, a privately observed random shock to
the sunk cost of opening a new outlet. For the ease of notation, we dene the state vector
sic = fni; nj ; ai; dic; djc; wic; wjc; zc; "eic; "sicg.
We now provide some details on the state variables. We treat all outlets of a chain to be
homogenous within a city in terms of prots. We allow the outlets of the two chains to be
di¤erent from one another in terms of prot per customer, xed cost of operations, etc. We
model variables d and w as discrete variables with exogenously given transition matrices.
We estimate the transition matrices, separately for each chain, from the data. Vector zc
contains city characteristics such as population, area, real GDP per capita, etc.
17We have dened these variables in Section 2.2.
18 If i denotes KFC then j denotes McDonalds and vice versa.
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3.2 Timing of Events
The timing of events for chain i in city c within a period is as follows. At the start of the
period the chain observes its state vector sic. Given sic, and its beliefs about the strategy
of its rival, the chain decides on xic, the number of new outlets to open in the city during
the period. It then pays, if applicable, the cost of entry into the city, cei (sic), and the sunk
cost of opening new outlet(s) csi (sic). Chain j makes a similar decision simultaneously. All
new outlets are opened for business at the end of the period and the state vector is updated
to s0ic. We discuss the state transitions in more detail in Section 3.5.
3.3 Static Prot Function
Our primary interest is in modeling a chains decisions about entry into and expansion
within a city. Both entry and expansion are dynamic decisions and we describe them in
some detail in the next subsection. Here we describe a chains static prot function. A
static prot function is appropriate for a fastfood rm because fastfood is neither a durable
nor a storable good. We dene prot for chain i in city c as:19
ic = [(ppm)i qi (nic; njc; Pc)  Fi]| {z }
Prot per outlet
nic. (2)
The expression in the square brackets is prot per outlet. ppm is prot per meal. This
is simply the di¤erence between the price of a meal and the marginal cost of producing the
meal. We assume all meals of a chain to be homogenous. q is the number of meals per
outlet per year. We assume q to be a function of the number of own outlets in the city (nic),
the number of the rivals outlets in the city (njc) and the citys population (Pc). Fi is the
xed cost of running an outlet. Following the literature on static games of entry [Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992), Toivanen and Waterson (2005), Jia (2008), etc.] we adopt
a reduced-form approach and assume that qi is a linear function of nic; njc and Pc.20 This
translates into the following reduced-form equation for prots:21
ic (sicji ) =
h
i0 + 

ininic + 

injnjc + 

iPPc
i
nic. (3)
19We suppress the time subscripts because the prot function is static. The prot function of chain j is
similarly dened.
20We adopt a reduced-form approach because data on prices and market shares are not available. Our
primary interest is in how entry and expansion decisions are inuenced by the presence of the rival conditional
on demand side being given.
21We denote most of the parameters in this paper by Greek letter , and use superscripts and subscripts
to distinguish among them. We use superscripts to identify whether a parameter belongs to the prot
function (superscript ) or the cost of entry function (superscript e) or the sunk cost of opening a new outlet
(superscript s). We use i in the subscript to highlight that there are separate parameters for chains i and
j. The second symbol in the subscript, after i, identies the variable to which that coe¢ cient belongs. For
example, for parameter ini in (3), ni in the subscript tells us that this parameter measures the e¤ect of the
number of own outlets on prot per outlet.
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The parameter vector i consists of 4 parameters:
n
i0; 

ini ; 

inj ; 

iP
o
. Note that we
cannot separately identify xed cost or the prot per meal. However, we do not need to
do so because all we need is to dene prot as a function of state.22 We have chosen the
above specication because it is simple, parsimonious and we can estimate it by ordinary
least squares (OLS). We can also estimate the parameters in the prot function together
with the structural parameters subject to a scale restriction. We shall say more about the
estimation of the prot functions in Section 4.
To test the robustness of our structural parameter estimates we also try another speci-
cation for the prot function. To derive this specication, think about a city with population
Pc. Assume that a fraction f of population eats Western fastfood. Among those who eat
the Western fastfood, each individual eats an average of l meals per year. She divides these
meals between the two chains in proportion to their number of outlets in the city. So she
eats l  nini+nj meals at chain i outlets and l 
nj
ni+nj
meals at chain j outlets.23 Each meal
generates a prot of pi yuans for chain i and pj yuans for chain j. Finally, the xed cost
of operating an outlet is if for chain i and 

jf for chain j. Given these assumptions, the
period prot of chain i from city c is given by
ic (sicji ) =

iP=(ni+nj)
Pc
nic + njc
  if

nic, (4)
where iP=(ni+nj) = pilf . This specication is more restrictive than the one in (3) as it
imposes an arbitrary functional form on the variable prot. Once again, like the specication
in (3), we can estimate this prot function either by OLS or by normalizing one of the
parameters and estimating the rest together with the structural parameters.
3.4 Dynamic Problem
The dynamic problem of chain i is to choose xic, the number of new outlets to open in the
city during the period, to maximize the expected value of future prot streams. We can
write this problem in the form of the following Bellmans equation:
Vi
 
sicji; j

= max
xic

i (sicji ) + 1 (nic = 0) min (xic; 1) cei (sicjei )
+csi (sic; xicjsi )xic

+ EVi
 
s0icji; j

.
(5)
Note that the value function has i in the subscript. It implies that the two chains can
potentially have di¤erent value functions. This is motivated by the reduced-form regression
22Other state variables that could potentially explain prot are GDP per capita and age of the chain. We
did include them in some earlier specications but their e¤ect on prot was statistically insignicant.
23 If chain i is more popular than chain j and gets a more than proportional share of customers, we can
incorporate this by multiplying ni with a scalar greater than 1. Another way to do so would be to assume
that chain i generates more prot per meal than does chain j. Our empirical strategy is closer to the latter
assumption.
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results that we report later in Section 5.1. We take the reduced-form results as prelimi-
nary evidence that the prots and the costs of entry and expansion could potentially be
asymmetric across chains and give rise to di¤erent value functions. For the same reason,
functions i (), cei () and csi () are also subscripted by i.
The value function in (5) is dened at the city level. The spillovers from own and rivals
outlets in neighboring cities are captured by the distance (dic and djc) and network (wic
and wjc) variables. The country-level expansion policy is captured by the age variable ai.
The age, distance and network variables also serve another important purpose in the model.
In the dynamic problem in (5), the chain maximizes value at the city level and does not
take into account the e¤ect (positive or negative) of its decisions in the city on the value
of the chain in other cities. Variables ai, dic and wic capture the interdependence across
cities indirectly. Although variables dic and wic evolve exogenously, because their evolution
and the parameters associated with them are estimated from the data, they capture the
collective e¤ects of city-level decisions in a summary way.
We now dene and explain various components of (5). The value function in (5) depends
on state vector sic = fni; nj ; ai; dic; djc; wic; wjc; zc; "eic; "sicg, conditional on i and j . The
vector i = f;i ;ei ;sig contains all the parameters of the model that we aim to estimate
for chain i. We describe these parameters in some detail in Section 4.1. The function j
represents chain is beliefs about the strategy prole of the rival chain j. We assume a
rational expectation equilibrium and hence in equilibrium the expected strategy prole of
the rival coincides with the equilibrium strategy prole.24
The chain chooses xic to maximize the expression inside the curly braces. The optimal
solution to this problem is a strategy prole i
 
sicji; j

. We say more about it when we
dene equilibrium in Section 3.6.
The expression contained in square brackets in (5) represents the period return from the
city. The rst term in the square brackets, i (sicji ), is the static prot function for chain
i. We have already discussed the static prot function in Section 3.3.
The second term in the square brackets is 1 (nic = 0) min (xic; 1) cei (sicjei ). It is related
to the cost of entering a new city. The rst component, 1 (nic = 0), is an indicator variable
that takes the value 1 if the chain does not have an outlet in the city at the beginning of
the period, i.e. nic = 0. So the cost of entry is only relevant if the chain is opening outlets
in the city for the rst time. The second component, min (xic; 1), implies that even if a
chain opens more than one outlet during the period of entry, it pays the cost of entry only
once.25 The third component, cei (sicjei ), is the cost of entry, which is explicitly dened in
equation (7) below. The parameters in vector ei will inform us, among other things, about
the e¤ects of own and rivals networks of outlets on the cost of entry.
24Also see the denition of equilibrium in Section 3.6 below.
25 In our dataset, in about 14% of the cases (32 cities out of 230 for KFC and 20 cities out of 142 for
McDonalds) a chain opens more than one outlet during the calendar year of its entry into a new city.
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The third term in the square brackets is csi (sic; xicjsi )xic. It represents the sunk cost of
opening xic new outlets in the city. The rst component, csi (sic; xicjsi ), is the sunk cost of
opening a single outlet. The second component, xic, is the number of new outlets opened
in the city during the period. We dene csi () explicitly in equation (9). The parameters in
vector si will inform us about the e¤ects of own and rivals networks on the sunk cost of
opening a new outlet and hence on the expansion decisions.
The entry and sunk cost terms enter equation (5) with positive signs. This implies that
if these costs are positive then we shall have cei (sicjei ) < 0 and csi (sic; xicjsi ) < 0. The
reason for writing them in this way is that we would like to have a negative sign for every
parameter that contributes negatively to the period return function and a positive sign for
every parameter that contributes positively. The benet of doing so will be clear when we
present and discuss the estimation results in Section 5.2.
The last term in (5) is the present discounted continuation value. Parameter  2 (0; 1)
is the discount factor. EVi is the expected continuation value, where the expectation is over
the evolution of sic and over the probability distributions of the rivals private shocks.
3.5 State Transitions
We now turn to the evolution of state variables in the model. The evolution of nic and njc,
conditional on choice, is straight forward. Using a prime (0) to denote next period values
n0ic = nic + xic, and
E

n0jc

= njc + E (xjc) .
(6)
There is an expectation sign on xjc because chain i does not observe the private cost shocks
of its rival.
We assume that the state variables fdic; djc; wic; wjcg follow rst-order Markov processes
that we estimate from the data. By construction, variables dic and djc decline over time as
the chains expand their network of outlets. Hence the transition probability matrices for
these variables are lower triangular. The absorbing state for these variables is 0, which is
reached when a chain opens its rst outlet in the city, i.e. when nic > 0, dic = 0. The same
is true for chain j. Variables wic and wjc are weakly increasing over time and hence have
upper-triangular transition matrices. We assume these variables to enter an absorbing state
when they take values greater than 100.26
The city characteristic vector z includes area, population and GDP per capita. We
assume area to be constant over time.27 We assume population and GDP per capita to
follow rst-order Markov processes that we estimate from the data.
26 In our dataset, the variable w exceeds 100 in only 2:2% of the cases for KFC and 1:1% of the cases for
McDonalds.
27The area of some cities in the sample is not constant due to changes in the administrative jurisdiction
of the cities over time.
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Age, ai, increases by one unit every period deterministically until it reaches the absorbing
state a. Once ai = a, it remains constant. We set a = 50. Here the implicit assumption
is that the additional benets from more experience dissipate after a chain has been in the
country long enough.
The private shocks to the cost of entry ("ei ) and sunk cost of opening a new outlet ("
s
i )
are assumed i.i.d. over time, across cities and across the two chains. They are drawn from
zero mean normal distributions with ei and 
s
i standard deviations.
3.6 Equilibrium
We use the concept of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). The MPE of our model consists
of strategy proles i

sicji; j

and j (sjcjj ; i ) such that i

sicji; j

is an optimal
solution to the dynamic program in (5) and j (sjcjj ; i ) is an optimal solution to a similar
program for chain j.
4 Estimation
In this section we discuss issues related to the estimation of our model in some detail. In
Section 4.1 we specify the functional forms and list the parameters to be estimated. In Sec-
tion 4.2 we discuss our estimation methodology. In Section 4.3 we talk about identication
and in Section 4.4 we dene our measures of cost spillovers.
4.1 Parameters to Estimate
The objective of estimation is to estimate parameters in vector i = fi ;ei ;sig.28 We now
describe the parameters in some detail.
The number of parameters in vector i depends on the specication of the prot func-
tion. If we adopt the specication in (3), then the vector i consists of the following four
parameters:
n
i0; 

ini ; 

inj ; 

iP
o
. Instead, if we adopt the specication in (4), the vector
i consists of the following two parameters:
n
iP=(ni+nj); 

if
o
.
Parameters in vector ei are related to the cost of entry into a city. We parameterize it
as
cei (sictjei ) = ei0+eiP=APct=Ac+eiyyct+eiaiait+eia2i a
2
it+
e
idi
dict+
e
idj
djct+
e
injnjct+
e
i 
e
ict.
(7)
Note that ni does not appear in (7) because the entry cost is paid only if ni = 0 (and
xi  1). 29 Parameter ei0 is the xed cost of entry which is independent of other factors.
28We do not include the discount factor  in the list of the parameters to be estimated. Our dataset does
not allow us to identify the discount factor.
29We do not include density variables in the specication of entry costs because they are highly correlated
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Parameters eiP=A and 
e
iy measure the e¤ects of population density and GDP per capita on
the cost of entry. Parameters eiai and 
e
ia2i
measure the e¤ect of experience in the country
on the cost of entry. As a chain becomes more experienced, it may enter new cities at a
lower cost. Parameters eidi and 
e
idj
measure the e¤ect of the proximity of own and rivals
network on the cost of entry. If there are economies of density, one would expect a smaller
distance from own or rivals network to contribute positively to the period return function
and lower the cost of entry. Parameter einj measures the e¤ect of rivals presence in the city
on the cost of entry: if there are positive information spillovers from prior presence of the
rival in the city, we would expect a lower cost of entry. The last term in (7) is the private
shock to the cost of entry. It has two components. The rst component, ei , is a standard
normal variable and the second component, ei , which is another structural parameter to
be estimated, is the standard deviation of the shock. The above parameterization of the
cost of entry has a very simple interpretation. To see it clearly, we rewrite (7) as
cei (sictjei ) = cei (sictjei ) + ei eict. (8)
Because we have assumed ei to be a standard normal variable, our parametrization of
entry cost models it as a normally distributed variable with mean cei and standard deviation
ei .
Parameters in vector si are related to the sunk cost of opening a new outlet. We
parameterize it as30
csi (sictjsi ) = si0 + siP=APct=Ac + siyyct + siaiait + sia2i a
2
it + 
s
iwiwict + 
s
iwjwjct
+sixixict + 
s
ininict + 
s
injnjct + 
s
i 
s
ict.
(9)
Parameter si0 is the xed cost of opening a new outlet. Parameters 
s
iP=A and 
s
iy measure
the e¤ects of population density and GDP per capita on the sunk cost of opening a new
outlet. Parameters siai and 
s
ia2i
measure the e¤ect of experience on the sunk cost. Para-
meters siwi and 
s
iwj measure the e¤ect of network density on the sunk cost. A denser own
network may make it cheaper for the chain to open a new outlet. Parameter sixi measures
the e¤ect of the number of own new outlets being opened on the sunk cost. The idea is
that the sunk cost per outlet may be di¤erent if more outlets are opened simultaneously.
Parameters sini and 
s
inj measure the e¤ect of own and rivals outlets in the city on the
sunk cost of opening a new outlet. The private shock to the sunk cost of opening a new
outlet is si
s
i , where 
s
i is a standard normal variable and 
s
i is the standard deviation of
the shock, which is another structural parameter to be estimated. This parameterization
of sunk cost, just like that of entry cost above, has a simple interpretation. To see that, we
with the distance variables. The correlation between the distance and density variables is  0:31 for KFC
and  0:24 for McDonalds. Both correlations are signicant at 1% level.
30We do not include distance variable in (9) because, by denition, the value of distance variable is zero
after the chain has entered a city.
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rewrite (9) as
csi (sictjsi ) = csi (sictjsi ) + si sict. (10)
Because we assume si to be a standard normal variable, our estimated sunk cost will be
normally distributed with mean csi and standard deviation 
s
i .
An implicit assumption behind the entry- and sunk-cost functions in (7) and (9) is that
they depend on all relevant state variables. This may or may not be true. We include all
relevant variables in our specications and let the data decide which ones actually have a
signicant e¤ect on these economic costs.
Given our research question about the spillovers from the rival and how they compare
with the spillovers from own network of outlets, the parameters of interest in the entry-cost
function are eidi ; 
e
idj
and einj . These parameters measure the e¤ect on the cost of entry
of own distance from the city, the rivals distance from the city and the number of rivals
outlets in the city, respectively. The parameters of interest in the sunk-cost function are
siwi , 
s
iwj , 
s
ini and 
s
inj . The rst two measure the e¤ect of own and rivals network density
on the sunk cost of opening a new outlet. The last two measure the e¤ect of the number of
own and rivals outlets in the city on the sunk cost. We dene our measures of spillovers in
Section 4.4.
To sum up, in our benchmark specication there are 25 parameters to estimate for each
chain: ; i (4 parameters); 
e
i (9 parameters) and 
s
i (11 parameters). Of these, 24 are
unique to each chain and , the discount factor, is common across the chains. We cannot
identify  from our dataset so we assign it a xed value and assume  = 0:90. For the rest
of the parameters, we discuss our estimation methodology in the following sub-section.
4.2 Estimation Methodology
Until recently the structural estimation of dynamic games was di¢ cult due to the heavy
computational burden of estimation and the problem of multiple equilibria. However, using
the insight of Hotz and Miller (1993), a number of recent studies have proposed computa-
tionally e¢ cient methods to estimate parameters of dynamic games. Leading papers in this
literature include Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari et al. (2007), Pakes et al. (2007)
and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). To deal with the large state space in the
dynamic game here, we employ the method proposed by Bajari et al. (2007), from here on
BBL.
The estimation process has two stages. In the rst stage, we estimate the static prot
functions. We also estimate equilibrium policy functions under the assumption that the
choices that we observe in the data represent a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the
game. In the same step, we also estimate the empirical transition probability matrices for
the relevant variables. We then use the estimates of static prot functions, equilibrium
policy functions and state transition matrices to compute numerical estimates of the value
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functions using forward simulations. We also compute the numerical estimates of the value
function when the rm in question deviates from the observed equilibrium policy. Under the
assumption of Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the values generated from equilibrium policies
should be higher than those generated under alternative policies. If this is not the case, then
our equilbirum condition is violated and we record the di¤erence between the equilibrium
and the alternative values. In the second stage, we pick the parameter vector that minimizes
the squared sum of these di¤erences over all alternative policies and all observed states of
the world. We now explain the estimation steps in some detail.
4.2.1 First Stage
In the rst stage we estimate the static prot functions, equilibrium policies, state-transition
matrices and numerical value functions.
Static Prot Functions To estimate either of the two specications of the static prot
function in (3) and (4), we need city-level data on operating income, number of outlets (for
both chains) and population. We have already described our dataset in Section 2.2. Our
preferred estimation method for both specications is OLS. We use (3) as our benchmark
specication because it is simple to interpret and does not impose unnecessary restrictions
on the prot function. We use (4) to test the robustness of our results. Although the
parameters in the prot function can also be estimated together with the other structural
parameters, such joint estimation runs into identication problems. We present the results
of one such exercise in Section 6.3. There we also highlight the identication problem.
Equilibrium Policies A key element of BBLs methodology is the assumption that the
data represent a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Hence it is possible to estimate
equilibrium policies directly from the data. Ideally this should be done non-parametrically
but that would require a very large dataset. A more practical option is to use a exible
parametric specication.
We use Negative-Binomial (NB) models to estimate equilibrium policies from the data.
The NB model is appropriate for our purpose because the dependent variable, i.e. the
number of new outlets opened, is a count variable with many zero observations (see Table
4). Also, the variance of the number of new outlets far exceeds its mean (see Table 5),
hence a NB model is more suitable than a simple Poisson model.
To estimate equilibrium policies from data, we regress the number of new outlets opened
during a period on various state variables. We do so separately for the two chains. We
comment on the estimated policies in Section 5.1.
State-Transition Matrices In our model, there are six state variables that we assume
to follow rst-order Markov processes: GDP per capita; population; two distance variables
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(di and dj) and two network variables (wi and wj). For all the six variables, we estimate
the state-transition matrices from the data. In the following we explain how we do so using
the distance variable di as an example. We follow the same procedure for the other ve
variables. To estimate the state-transition matrices, we rst discretize the variable.31 We
make sure that the discretization is rich enough to capture important variation in the data.
Let ps;s0 denote an element of the state-transition matrix, where s is the current period
state and s0 is the next period state. To nd the value of ps;s0 , we count the observations
in the data with the current state s and the future state s0. We then divide this number by
the number of observations in the data with the current state s.
ps;s0 =
P
1 (Current State = s and Next-period State = s0)P
1 (Current State = s)
, (11)
where 1 () is an indicator function and the sums are over all observations in the sample.
Numerical Estimates of Value Function We now explain how to construct numerical
estimates of the value functions using forward simulations. We omit city subscripts for ease
of notation. Let Rit be the period return function and let Bit = 1 (nit = 0) min (xit; 1).
Using (5) we can write the period return function as
Rit
 
sitji; i ; j

= i (sitji )nit  Bitcei (sitjei )  csi (sitjsi )xi;t: (12)
Note that the period return function is based on both chains playing their equilibrium
strategies i and 

j . We start from an arbitrary initial state si0 and use the rst-stage
estimated policy functions to get xi0 and xj0. Using si0, xi0 and xj0, and a given parameter
vector i, we compute the numerical value of Ri0. Using xi0 and xj0, and natures draws
for other state variables, we get si1 and then repeat the above steps to get Ri1. Continuing
this way, we get the sequence fRitgTt=0, where T is an arbitrarily chosen large number such
that T is close to zero.32 The present discounted value of these return functions gives us
one numerical estimate of the value function:
Vi
 
si0ji; i ; j

=
1X
t=0
tRit. (13)
We repeat this process a large number of times to reduce the simulation error due to the
randomness of the Markov processes and the private cost shocks. The average over these
simulations is our numerical estimate of the value function for a given state and a given set
of policy functions. We also compute the numerical estimates of the value function under
31 In Table C.1 we show how we discretize the distance variable.
32When we forward simulate, we impose an upper limit of 500 outlets in a city. This number is reasonable
because in our dataset the maximum number of KFC outlets is 191 (in Shanghai in 2007) and McDonalds
outlets is 117 (in Beijing in 2007). Even in the large US cities, where McDonalds and KFC outlets are
ubiquitous, the total number of outlets of these chains seldom exceeds 500. For example, the total number
of McDonalds outlets is 546 in New York city, 478 in Los Angeles and 398 in Chicago. The corresponding
numbers for KFC are: 233, 221 and 154. [Source: yellowpages.com, last accessed on March 7, 2013]
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alternative policies. We randomly draw 100 alternative policy parameter vectors according
to
p
0
= p (1 + ") , (14)
where "  N (0; 1), p is the equilibrium policy parameter vector and p0 is the alternative
policy parameter vector. Under both equilibrium and alternative policies, the number of
outlets to open is bounded between 0 and x, both inclusive. We set x = 50.33 If li denotes
the lth alternative policy, then Vi

si0ji; li; j

denotes the numerical estimate of the value
function when chain i follows policy l and its rival chain j follows the equilibrium policy.
4.2.2 Second Stage
If i is indeed the Markov Perfect Equilibrium policy then the following must hold at the
true parameter vector i .
Vi
 
si0ji ; i ; j
  Vi si0ji ; li; j . (15)
But the inequality may not hold for some states if i is replaced by an alternative parameter
vector i. BBL propose to estimate i by minimizing the violations of the last inequality.
More formally, let us dene a di¤erence variable d as
d

si0ji ; li; j

= Vi
 
si0ji ; i ; j
  Vi si0ji ; li; j , (16)
and a criterion function Q as
Q (i) =
X
si0
LX
l=1
h
min

d

si;0; z0ji; li; j

; 0
i2
, (17)
where the rst sum is over all states in the state space and the second sum is over L
alternative policies.34 The BBL point estimate of i is then given by
^i = arg min
i
Q (i) .
4.3 Identication
In BBLs method, the parameters of a model are point identied if there is a unique para-
meter vector that satises all possible equilibrium inequalities implied by (15). In practice,
to make estimation computationally feasible, one has to work with a sample analog of Q (i)
and compute it using a small subset of all possible initial states and a limited set of alter-
native policies. Srisuma (2010) discusses problems associated with this choice. He shows
that it is possible to lose a lot of identication information if the alternative policies are
33 In our dataset the maximum number of outlets that KFC has ever opened in a city within a year is 33
(in Shanghai in 2004). The maximum for McDonalds is 27 (in Shanghai in 2006).
34 In our application L = 100.
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not carefully chosen. He suggests that the set of alternative policies should be determined
by how the state variables are transformed into an action. In other words, the alternatives
should be informative about the structural parameters.
In our application we base Q (i) on all 3; 786 unique states that we observe in the data.
For each state, we consider 100 alternative policies by randomly perturbing each parameter
in the estimated policy function according to (14). This gives us 378; 600 equilibrium
conditions to estimate 20 dynamic parameters in our baseline specication for each chain.
We show below that these random perturbations are rich enough to uncover the underlying
structural parameters.
In our model, all the dynamic parameters that we estimate appear in one of the following
two functions: cei (sitjei ) and csi (sitjsi ). These functions are explicitly dened in (7) and
(9). Some state variables appear in both these functions. How do we separately identify
the structural parameters associated with these state variables? In the following, we answer
this question by using the state variable GDP per capita (yi) as an example. The same
reasoning can be applied to other state variables that appear in both (7) and (9).
Because the value function is linear in structural parameters (see (13)), we can explicitly
write the components of d

si0ji ; li; j

(see (16)) that depend on the state variable yi
as:35
d

si0ji ; li; j

= eiyi
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(18)
where fBit; xitgTt=0 sequences are generated by equilibrium policy i and

Blit; x
l
it
	T
t=0
se-
quences are generated by alternative policy li. As long asA1

si0jli; j

andA2

si0jli; j

are not perfectly correlated across di¤erent initial states and di¤erent alternative policies,
we should be able to separately identify the two parameters
 
eiyi and 
s
iyi

. Our simulations
suggest that, in general, such correlations are very small.
At a more intuitive level, parameters in the entry cost function are identied from the
variation in entry time due to a particular state. For example, if a chain enters a high GDP
per capita city earlier than a low GDP per capita city, other things being equal, this would
imply that a higher level of GDP per capita in a city lowers the cost of entry. Similarly
the parameters in the sunk cost function are identied from the variation in the number of
outlets opened due to a particular state. For example, if chain i opens more outlets in cities
with a higher number of own existing outlets, other things being equal, it would imply that
more own outlets reduce the sunk cost of opening new outlets in the city.
35Each d () is based on a single initial state si0 and a single alternative policy li. In our application,
there are 378; 600 such ds that enter the criterion function Q ().
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4.4 Measurement of Spillovers
In our model, the rival can a¤ect a chains cost of entry in one of the two ways.
1. If the rival is not present in the city in which the chain is considering entry then the
distance from the nearest city in which the rival is present (dj) may a¤ect the cost of
entry. This e¤ect is measured by parameter eidj .
2. If the rival is already present in the city, the extent of the rivals presence, measured by
the rivals number of outlets nj , may a¤ect the cost of entry. This e¤ect is measured
by parameter einj .
Both these variables, dj and nj , a¤ect cei , the mean of the distribution of entry cost (see
(8)). Our measure of spillovers due to a certain variable is the parameter corresponding
to that variable expressed in units of standard deviations. For example, we measure the
entry-cost spillovers due to dj by eidj=
e
i . The interpretation of this measure of spillovers
is simple: it measures the change in the average cost of entry caused by a unit change in dj
in units of standard deviations. Likewise, we measure the entry-cost spillovers due to nj by
einj=
e
i .
We apply the same idea to measure spillovers from own network of outlets. For example,
we measure the entry-cost spillovers due to the presence of own outlets in the nearby cities
by eidi=
e
i .
Once a chain has entered a city, there are two ways in which the rival can a¤ect the
chains sunk cost of opening a new outlet.
1. The density of the rivals outlets in and around the city, measured by wj , may a¤ect
the sunk cost of the chain. This e¤ect is measured by parameter siwj .
2. The number of rivals outlets in the city, which we denote by nj , may also a¤ect the
sunk cost. This e¤ect is measured by parameter sinj .
The two variables, wj and nj , a¤ect csi , the mean of the distribution of the sunk cost (see
(10)). Once again, we measure the spillovers by the size of the relevant parameter in units
of standard deviations. Specically, we measure the sunk-cost spillovers due to the rivals
network density by siwj=
s
i , and those due to the rivals number of outlets by 
s
inj=
s
i .
Similarly we measure sunk-cost spillovers due to own network density by siwi=
s
i and
those due to own number of outlets by sini=
s
i .
5 Estimation Results
Estimation proceeds in two stages as we explained in Section 4. In the following we discuss
the estimation results for each stage separately.
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5.1 First-Stage Estimates
In the rst stage we estimate the static prot functions, equilibrium policies, state-transition
matrices and numerical value functions. In the following, we discuss each of these estimates
in some detail.
5.1.1 Static Prot Functions
The estimates of the static prot functions are in Table 7. The estimates in the upper panel
are based on the specication of prot function in (3) and those in the lower panel are based
on the specication in (4).
The estimates for KFC in the upper panel suggest that it earns an average annual prot
of about Y17.234 million from an outlet. This prot declines by Y0.129 million with every
additional own outlet (the cannibalization e¤ect). Each additional rival outlet depresses
the prot by about Y0.022 million (the competition e¤ect). Our reduced-form estimates of
cannibalization and competition e¤ects are qualitatively similar to the structural estimates
in Aguirregabiria and Magesan (2012) except that for McDonalds they estimate the canni-
balization e¤ect to be positive, though statistically insignicant, in 2 of their 3 specications
(see their Table 10). We estimate that the overall population of the city has a positive e¤ect
on prots per outlet: an increase of a million people in population, boosts the prot per
outlet by about Y1 million.36 The estimates for McDonalds in the upper panel suggest an
average annual prot of Y10.228 million per outlet. An additional own outlet reduces the
prot by Y0.022 million and an additional rivals outlet reduces it by Y0.005 million. The
e¤ect of population is estimated to be negative, though it is statistically insignicant.
The estimates in the lower panel suggest positive xed costs and a positive e¤ect of
population per outlet on prots. These parameters are hard to interpret due to a very
restrictive specication of the prot function. We only use these estimates to test the
robustness of our structural parameter estimates.
Because these static prots are the gains that the chains expect to reap forever when
they enter a new market or expand within an existing market, they will a¤ect our estimates
of dynamic parameters in a non-trivial way. One can simply think of these prot functions as
normalizations that help us estimate dynamic parameters. A doubling of all the parameters
in the prot functions will lead to a doubling of all dynamic parameters. Hence, our
measures of spillovers that we introduced in Section 4.4 are independent of such rescaling.
If the static prot functions are so fundamental to our dynamic parameter estimates and
we have limited data to precisely estimate them, then does it not put the entire estimation
exercise into question? The answer is, no. We do not view our prot and cost estimates to
be denitive. We view them as instructive about the trends in the data. We use them in a
fully-specied model of entry and expansion to inform us about the underlying structural
36The population data used in estimation are in units of thousands.
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parameters. In this sense, this paper also has the avour of an applied theory work. If
more detailed data on operating income become available, one can re-estimate our model
to get more precise parameter estimates.37 We also perform comprehensive robustness
checks in Section 6.3 to show that the main conclusions of this study are robust to various
parameterizations of the prot function.
5.1.2 Equilibrium Policies
Our equilibrium policy estimates are in Table 8. The dependent variable is the number of
new outlets that a chain opens in a city within a year. Explanatory variables include a full
set of state variables and, in some cases, their higher order and interaction terms as well.
The state variables may a¤ect the entry and expansion decisions di¤erently. To account for
this we dene a potential entrantindicator variable, Ii, which takes the value 1 if chain i
has not yet entered the city, and 0 otherwise. To capture the di¤erential e¤ects of the state
variables on entry and expansion, we interact the potential entry indicator variable with
the state variables. For example consider the e¤ect of GDP per capita on KFCs entry and
expansion decisions. If KFC has yet to enter a city, the e¤ect is positive and the parameter
estimate is 0:024 (= 0:008 + 0:016). If KFC is already in the city, the e¤ect is still positive
but the parameter estimate is just 0:008.
We estimate separate policy functions for the two chains. Our results justify this choice
and we nd that the two chains repond quite di¤erently to some state variables. We estimate
highly signicant over-dispersion parameter for both chains. This justies our choice of a
Negative Binomial model over a Poisson model. The value of R2 is 0:306 for KFC and 0:289
for McDonalds. These suggests that our regressions can explain close to one-third of the
variation in the number of new outlets.
5.1.3 State Transition Matrices
We estimate the state transition matrices using the procedure that we described in Section
4.2.1. We report the estimated matrices in Appendix C (Tables C.2 to C.7). The transition
matrices for GDP per capita and population are the same for the two chains. The transition
matrix for GDP per capita, Table C.2, shows that although it is a persistent variable, it
generally has a high probability (around a quarter) of going up. This reects the rapid
growth of the Chinese economy during the sample period (1990-2007). The transition
matrix for population shows a much higher level of persistence and some probability (mostly
around 4%) of increase. This increase is mainly due to urbanization.
37We also tried to structurally estimate the prot functions together with the entry and sunk cost functions.
To do so we normalized parameter i0 to the abserved average prots per outlet. We present and discuss
one such set of estimates in Section 6.3, where we also discuss the possible failure of identication for that
estimation exercise.
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We estimate separate state-transition matrices for the distance variable for the two
chains. The results are in Tables C.4 and C.5. The estimates show that when high, distance
is more persistent for KFC. For example the probability of the distance staying within 2,000-
3,000km range is 0.84 for KFC and 0.62 for McDonalds. However, when low, distance is
more persistent for McDonalds. For example, the probability of the distance staying in
50-100km range is 0.89 for McDonalds and 0.80 for KFC.
We report the state-transition matrices for network density in Tables C.6 and C.7.
It takes some time to build the network so at the lower levels, network density is more
persistent for both chains. However, once the chains get going, the growth is quite rapid:
the pobabilities of going up are very high for the 2-5 range. Although the growth appears
to slow down at higher values, it is primarily because of the wider range for the individual
bins that we have chosen while discretizing this variable.
5.2 Second-Stage Estimates
The structural parameter estimates are in Table 9. All the estimates are in millions of yuans.
As we discussed in Section 4.3, there are 378,600 equilibrium conditions in our estimation
algorithm. At the bottom of the table we report the percentage of the equilibrium conditions
that are satised at the optimum.
We report the standard errors in the parentheses under the relevant coe¢ cient estimates.
These are bootstrapped standard errors. We randomly choose 30 subsamples of 123 cities
each, with replacement, from a total of 246 cities. For each subsample we re-estimate the
equilibrium policies, state transition matrices and the structural parameters. Let ^i denote
the vector of estimated structural parameters based on the full sample and ^im denote the
vector of the estimated structural parameters from the mth subsample (m = f1; 2; : : : ; 30g),
then the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix of ^i is given by
Var

^i

=
1
30
30X
m=1
h
^im   ^i
i h
^im   ^i
i0
.
Although the computational burden of BBLs estimation method is low, it is nontrivial
nonetheless. For example, the forward simulations to estimate the benchmark structural
parameters for this paper took 24 days of CPU time and those to estimate the structural
parameters from the 30 subsamples took a total of 375 days of CPU time.38
The estimates in Table 9 are our benchmark estimates. In the next section we use these
estimates to answer the research question that motivated this paper: are there cost spillovers
from the rivals network of outlets and how do they compare with the cost spillovers from
own network?
38These simulations were run on HP Xeon Quad-core processors with CPU speeds of 1.7GHz each.
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6 Spillovers
We do three things in this section and devote a subsection to each of them. In Section
6.1, we explain and interpret the structural parameter estimates. In Section 6.2, we discuss
the cost spillovers from the rival and compare them with the spillovers from own outlets.
Finally, in Section 6.3, we perform some sensitivity checks on our structural parameter
estimates.
6.1 Interpretation of Estimates
For the structural parameter estimates that we report in Table 9, a negative coe¢ cient
represents a negative contribution to the period return and hence an increase in cost. As
stated earlier, all estimates are in millions of yuans. We start with entry cost parameter
estimates that we report in the upper panel of Table 9. The estimates of eiP=A imply that an
increase in population density of one thousand people per square kilometer reduces the cost
of entry by Y346.15 million for KFC and by Y18.11 million for McDonalds. The estimates
of eiy imply that an increase in GDP per capita of one thousand yuans decreases the cost
of entry by Y21.57 million for KFC and Y1.07 million for McDonalds. The estimates of
eia and 
e
ia2 imply that the marginal e¤ect of an increase of one year in national experience,
proxied by age, is to reduce the cost of entry by Y(76:23 + 91:92a) million for KFC.39 The
marginal e¤ect for McDonalds is to change the cost of entry by Y(11:21  0:98a) million.
Hence, for the rst 11 years, age actually increased the cost of entry for McDonalds and it
reduced it only by a small amount afterwards. The increase in the cost of entry with more
national experience for McDonalds could be due to its capacity constraints in the national
expansion process.
More relevant for our purpose are the estimates of eidi , 
e
idj
and einj . The estimates of
eidi suggest that if the city in question is one kilometer closer to a city with at least one own
outlet, the cost of entry is lower by Y3.01 million for KFC and Y0.21 million for McDonalds.
In Figure B.1 we show, for all 216 cities that KFC entered from 1995 onwards, boxplots of
distance from the nearest city with at least one own outlet. We do so for the year of entry as
well as for the 5 consecutive years before entry. The median of the distribution drops from
238 km to just 105 km in ve years. This decrease of 133 km in distance reduces the cost
of entry by Y400 million for KFC. This e¤ect is large and comparable to the e¤ect on entry
cost for KFC if the population density of the city went up by 1 standard deviation, say from
1.21 thousand people per square kilometer to 2.33. These estimates suggest the presence of
the economies of density just as in Holmes (2011) and Aguirregabiria and Magesan (2012).
The estimates of eidj suggest that if the city in question is one kilometer closer to a city
with at least one rival outlet, the cost of entry is lower by Y1.80 million for KFC and Y0.62
39The contribution of age to the cost of entry of KFC is to reduce it by 76:23a+45:96a2. We di¤erentiate
it with respect to a to get the marginal e¤ect.
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million for McDonalds. So the cost of entry is inuenced more by own distance than by
rivals distance for KFC. For McDonalds, the rivals distance has a stronger e¤ect. The
estimates for einj imply that if the rival has one more outlet in the city, the cost of entry is
Y220.18 million higher for KFC and Y24.24 million lower for McDonalds.
The overall story that our estimates tell about the chainsentry into new cities is the
following. As KFC gains experience in the country, it expands rapidly focusing on more
densely populated and richer cities rst. It is also more likely to enter a city if the city
is closer (as measured by distance) to its own network or to its rivals network. However,
other things being equal, it is less likely to enter a city in which McDonalds is already
present. In our dataset, KFC is the rst mover in about 75% of the cities. The estimation
results suggest that KFC is likely to make an initial entry into a comparable new market
before entering McDonalds territories. The story for McDonalds is slightly di¤erent. In
the rst few years of operations in China, it grows cautiously and mostly follows KFC. It is
more likely to enter the cities in which KFC is already present or that are closer to KFCs
network.
We next comment on the sunk-cost parameter estimates that we report in the lower
panel of Table 9. Population density and GDP per capita lower the sunk cost for both
chains but their e¤ect on the sunk cost is very small compared to that on the entry cost.
The age e¤ect on sunk cost of expansion is not signicant for KFC. Age increases sunk cost
for McDonalds but at a decreasing rate, and the e¤ect is much smaller compared to the
e¤ect of age on the entry cost. An increase in own network density increases the sunk cost for
KFC but decreases it for McDonalds. This may suggest that KFC is pursuing a balanced
expansion strategy: it is more likely to expand in a city where the regional network density
is relatively low than to add more outlets to a city where the regional network density is
already high. McDonalds, on the other hand, is likely to open more outlets in a city with
higher own network density. An increase in the rivals network density has the opposite
e¤ects for both chains. While KFC is more likely to expand in a city surrounded by more
rivals outlets, McDonalds is less likely to add additional outlets when the rivals network
is strong. The estimates of sixi imply that when a chain opens more outlets simultaneously,
for example 2 instead of 1, the sunk cost per outlet is higher. The estimates of sini and 
s
inj
are positive and signicant, implying that more own or rival outlets reduce the sunk cost,
but again the magnitudes are small.
The overall story of expansion within a city is less interesting because the estimated
parameters are small in value. Both chains expand more rapidly if there is a greater number
of own or rivals outlets in the city. However, simultaneously opening more own outlets
increases sunk cost. KFC expands faster in cities with higher per capita income.
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6.2 Extent of Spillovers
We compute the spillovers by using the methodology that we described in Section 4.4. The
results are in Table 10. We begin our discussion of the results with the entry-cost spillovers
from the rivals presence in the nearby cities. A 100-kilometer decrease in rivals distance
decreases the entry cost by 1.22 SDs for KFC and by 1.52 SDs for McDonalds. These
spillovers are substantial and they may be capturing multiple factors. For example, the
rivals presence in the nearby cities may drive the local suppliers of fast-food chains to
grow, which can benet the entry of the focal chain. In addition, the entry of the rival in
the region reduces the uncertainty and potentially saves the cost of exploring the market.
How do these spillovers compare with spillovers from own presence in nearby cities? A
100-kilometer decrease in own distance decreases the entry cost by 2.03 SDs for KFC and
by 0.51 SDs for McDonalds.
The second e¤ect of a rival on entry cost comes from the rivals presence within the city.
Our estimates suggest that a one-unit increase in rivals outlets increases entry cost by 1.49
SDs for KFC but decreases it by 0.59 SDs for McDonalds. The increase in KFCs entry
cost could be the result of a combination of the following two factors: 1) it avoids the cities
in which McDonalds is already present; 2) because it is the rst mover in most of the cases,
we estimate its implicit cost of entry to be lower for the cities where none of the two chains
is present.
At this point, it is instructive to discuss the potential implications of these spillovers.
To save on space, we focus on the e¤ect of KFCs presence on McDonalds cost of entry.
The implications of other spillovers can be analyzed in a similar way. Our estimates suggest
that a one-unit increase in KFCs outlets decreases entry cost by 0.59 SDs for McDonalds.
We arrived at this number by computing enj=
e
i (24:24=40:74). To see the implications of
this number for McDonalds entry decisions, let us assume that the mean of McDonalds
estimated entry-cost distribution is zero. Also assume that KFCs has nj outlets in the
city. We can then plot the estimated distribution of McDonalds entry cost as a normal
distribution with zero mean and 40.74 standard deviation. We plot this distribution in
Figure 2 and mark it as cei (nj). Now consider an increase in the number of KFCs outlets
from nj to nj + 1. Assume that everything else remains the same. Because we estimate
enj to be  24:24, the estimated distribution of McDonalds entry cost will shift to the left
by 24.24 units. The new distribution will have a mean of  24:24 but the same standard
deviation. We also plot the new distribution in Figure 2 and mark it as cei (nj + 1). Given
these distributions, we can compare the probability of McDonalds entry into the city when
KFCs has nj outlets with the probability of entry when KFCs has nj + 1 outlets. We
compute these probabilities for a range of expected benets of entry and plot them in Panel
(a) of Figure 3.40 The curve marked pei (nj) maps McDonalds expected benet of entry into
40The expected benet of entering a new city with one outlet is given by [EVi
 
s0ic; ni = 1ji; j
  
EVi
 
s0ic; ni = 0ji; j

]. This benet should be compared with the sum of entry and sunk costs. The
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its probability of entering the city when the number of KFCs outlets in the city is nj . The
curve marked pei (nj + 1) maps McDonalds expected benet of entry into its probability
of entering the city when the number of KFCs outlets in the city is nj + 1. When the
expected benet of entry is very low, say less than  150, the probability of McDonalds
entry is almost zero regardless of whether KFC has nj or nj + 1 outlets in the city. When
the expected benet is very high, say more than 100, the probability of McDonalds entry
is almost 1 regardless of whether KFC has nj or nj + 1 outlets in the city. However, when
the expected benet of entry is between  150 and 100, the two probabilities are di¤erent.
We plot their di¤erence in Panel (b) of Figure 3. For example, when the expected benet
of entry is zero and KFC has nj outlets in the city, the probability of McDonalds entry is
slightly less than 0.5. However, if KFC has one more outlet in the city, the probability of
McDonalds entry increases to slightly more than 0.7. In other words, when the expected
benet of entry is 0, one more KFC outlet increases McDonalds probability of entry by more
than 0.2. This simple example illustrates that a spillover of 0.59 SDs can have substantial
e¤ects on the probability of entry.
To sum up, the spillovers from the rival are substantial in a¤ecting the entry cost for both
KFC and McDonalds. For McDonalds, both the rivals distance from, and its presence
in, the city reduce the cost of entry. For KFC, the rivals distance reduces the cost but its
presence in the city increases the cost.
Once a chain has entered the city, the spillovers from the rival in our model come from
two sources: density of the rivals network in and around the city and the number of rivals
outlets in the city. We report these spillovers in the lower panel of Table 10. A 10-unit
increase in the rivals network density decreases the sunk cost by 0.03 SDs for KFC but
increases it by 0.03 SDs for McDonalds. These e¤ects are small. When we consider the
e¤ects of own network density, the magnitudes are slightly bigger but the signs are opposite
for both chains. In summary, KFC is more likely to expand when the rival has a higher
network density and when its own network density is lower. On the other hand, McDonalds
is more likely to expand when the rival has a lower network density and its own network
density is higher.
What about the e¤ect of the number of rivals existing outlets on a chains expansion?
The estimates at the bottom of Table 10 suggest that these e¤ects are negligible for both
chains. Not only this, the e¤ects from own existing outlets are also small for both chains.
Hence, our estimates suggest that the e¤ects of own or rivals existing outlets on expansion
of a chain are very small. In Figure 4 we compare the e¤ects of one more KFC outlet
on McDonalds probabilities of entry and expansion. The expression pei (nj + 1)   pei (nj)
denotes the di¤erence in the probabilities of entry and it is exactly the same as the di¤erence
plotted in Panel (b) of Figure 3. Notice the di¤erence in the units on y-axis between Figures
expected benet, the entry cost and the sunk cost are all a¤ected by the number of rivals outlets. However,
to focus on the cost of entry, we assume that a change in the number of the rivals outlets only a¤ects the
cost of entry and does not a¤ect the expected benet or the sunk cost.
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3(b) and 4. This di¤erence peaks at around 0.23 (Figure 3). It means that if KFC has one
more outlet in the city, the probability of McDonalds entry could increase by up to 0.23. The
expression pexpi (nj + 1)  pexpi (nj) in Figure 4 denotes the di¤erence in the probabilities of
McDonalds expansion by one outlet if KFC has one more outlet in the city. This di¤erence
is almost negligible and even at its maximum it is less than 0:001. It means that if KFC has
one more outlet in the city, it has hardly any e¤ect on McDonalds probability of expansion.
We would like to make two comments about the results above. First, the estimates that
we report are based on implicit entry and sunk costs that rationalize the observed choices
as equilibirum outcomes. So when we say that a particular variable has very little e¤ect
on the sunk cost it implies that the observed decisions of the chain suggest so, under the
assumption that the chain behaves according to our model. Second, the estimates and the
e¤ects that they imply are what we get from the data. We do not have a deep theory to
explain why the estimates take the signs that they do and why their magnitude is what it
is. So, for example, when we estimate an e¤ect that is di¤erent between the two chains, we
do not have a theory to explain why it is di¤erent.
6.3 Robustness of the Results
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our results to a number of variations on the
benchmark model. To save on space, we focus on KFC. We report the rst set of results in
Table C.8. The results in column (1) are the benchmark estimates. They are the same as
those reported in column (1) of Table 9. Corresponding to the 7 columns in Table C.8, we
report the 7 sets of spillover estimates in Table C.9.
Changing the Distribution of Cost Shocks For the benchmark estimates, we
assumed that the shocks to entry and sunk costs follow a standard normal distribution. We
change this assumption for the estimates in column (2) of Table C.8 and assume that the
shocks to entry and sunk costs follow an extreme value distribution. The estimates barely
change.
Estimating the Prot Function in the Second Stage For the estimates in column
(3) of Table C.8, we x i0 and estimate the remaining parameters of the prot function
together with the dynamic structural parameters. In one sense the joint estimation of prot
and sunk-cost parameters is better than our benchmark approach of estimating the prot
function parameters in the rst stage and the sunk-cost parameters in the second stage.
However, this is not our preferred approach because it is di¢ cult to separately identify the
parameters of the prot function from those of the sunk-cost function. To illustrate the
failure of identication, we use the example of the state variable nj , the number of rivals
outlet in the city. First we write the components of d

si0ji ; li; j

(see (16)) that depend
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on the state variable nj as:41
d

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Recall from Section 4.3 that each d () is based on a single initial state si0 and a single
alternative policy li. In order to separately identify 

inj and 
s
inj , we need some independent
variation between B1 and B3. Based on our forward simulation results the correlation
between B1 and B3 is 0.987 for both KFC and McDonalds. Such high correlation renders
separate identication of inj and 
s
inj di¢ cult. On a related note, the correlation betwen
B1 and B2 is mere 0.018 for KFC and 0.054 for McDonalds. This means that if we x
sinj , we can separately identify 

inj and 
e
inj . Likewise, the correlation betwen B2 and B3 is
mere 0.016 for KFC and 0.047 for McDonalds. This means that if we x inj , or estimate
it separately as we do for our preferred specication, we can separately identify einj and
sinj .
Regardless of whether we estimate the prot function parameters in the rst stage or
in the second stage, our conclusion about the spillovers remains the same: the spillovers to
the entry cost are large and those to the sunk cost are neglibile. We can see this is column
(3) of Table C.9.
Using a Di¤erent Prot Function For the estimates in column (4) of Table C.8, we
use the static prot function in column (1) of the lower panel of Table 7. This specication
of prot is more restrictive than our benchmark specication. The entry-cost spillovers in
column (4) of Table C.9 are smaller than those in column (1), the benchmark case, but still
quite substantial compared to the sunk-cost spillovers, which remain negligible.
Excluding Age Variable from the Model The age variable plays a very important
role in our model. It proxies for the overall expansion policy of the chains in the country.
For the estimates in column (5), we exclude the age variable from our model. The spillovers
are smaller in this case (Table C.9 column (5)) but the same conclusion holds that the
spillovers to the cost of entry are substantial and those to the sunk cost are negligible.
An important di¤erence from the benchmark spillovers is that in column (5) an increase
in rivals number of outlets decreases the entry cost. Intuitively, when we exclude the age
variable, the estimation routine wrongly assigns the positive e¤ect from age to the rivals
number of outlets. Also, when we exclude the age variable from the model, the percentage of
equilibrium conditions that are satised at the nal parameter estimates drops from 95:06%
41 In our application, there are 378; 600 such ds that enter the criterion function Q ().
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to 91:32%, suggesting that the specication without the age variable is less satisfactory. We
interpret these result as a validation of our decision to include age as a separate state
variable in the model.
Understanding the Spillover Parameters One interpretation of our benchmark
sunk-cost spillover parameters (Table C.8, column (1)) is that because we estimate negative
cannibalization and compeition e¤ects in the rst stage (ini =  0:129 and inj =  0:022),
to rationalize the observed outcomes our structural model generates positive spillover pa-
rameters (sini = 1:60 and 
s
inj = 0:20). We see a similar pattern in column (3) when we
jointly estimate prot and sunk-cost parameters: ini =  0:013 and inj =  0:002 are both
negative and sini = 0:28 and 
s
inj = 0:03 are both positive. What if we force 
s
ini and 
s
inj to
be equal to zero and then estimate ini and 

inj using the structural model? The estimates
of ini and 

inj would then show the net spillovers from own and rival outlets. We report
the results of this experiment in column (6) of Table C.8. The estimates suggest that the
net own spillovers are positive (ini = 0:011) and statistically signicant. The spillovers
from the rival are also positive (inj = 0:003) but not statistically signicant. In column
(7) we do the reverse: we set ini and 

inj equal to zero and use the structural model to
estimate sini and 
s
inj . The results suggest positive and statistically signicant spillovers
from both own and rivals outlets. Although these spillovers are very small when expressed
in units of standard deviations, the results in columns (6) and (7) suggest that they are
there and our structural model is able to identify them.
Changing the Parameters of the Prot Function In this set of robustness checks
we change the parameter values in the static prot function, one at a time, to see how
such specic changes a¤ect our estimates of structural parameters and consequently the
spillovers. The benchmark reduced-form prot function has four parameters: i0, 

ini , 

inj
and iP . In Table C.10 we report structural estimates when each of these parameters is
either set equal to zero or is doubled in value. The benchmark results are in column (1). In
columns (8) and (9) we vary i0, in columns (10) and (11) we vary 

ini , in columns (12) and
(13) we vary inj and in coulmns (14) and (15) we vary 

iP . Once again, corresponding to
each column in Table C.10, we report spillovers in the corresponding column in Table C.11.
In the following discussion, we focus on the spillovers and refer to the structural estimates
only when needed.
In column (8) we set i0 equal to zero. This change slightly reduces the size of entry-cost
spillovers. The sunk-cost spillovers are more or less unchanged. In column (9), we double
i0 relative to its benchmark value. The entry-cost spillovers increase and the sunk-cost
spillovers are again broadly the same.
In column (10), we set ini equal to zero. This eliminates the demand cannibalization
e¤ect. The result is lower estimated spillovers. The intuition is that if more own outlets do
not exert a negative e¤ect on prot per outlet, we need smaller spillovers to rationalize the
observed entry and expansion outcomes. In column (11), we set ini equal to the double of
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its benchmark value. Although this change increases the cost estimates (see column (11)
in Table C.10) across the board, it increases the estimated standard deviations of the cost
shocks more than proportionally. Hence the spillovers, in units of SDs, are smaller.
In column (12), we set inj equal to zero. The e¤ect on spillovers is small because the
benchmark estimate for this parameter was already very small. In column (13), when we
double the size of this parameter, the spillovers increase. The e¤ect on sunk-cost spillovers is
much bigger than that on entry-cost spillovers. Nonetheless, the sunk-cost spillovers remain
much smaller than the entry-cost spillovers.
In column (14), we set iP equal to zero. This leads to smaller spillovers. In column
(15) when we double iP the entry-cost spillovers are larger but the sunk-cost spillovers are
smaller. The sunk-cost spillovers are smaller because we estimate a much larger standard
deviation of shocks to the sunk cost.
A general look at Table C.11 suggests that although there are important changes in the
size of spillovers when we change the values of individual parameters in the static prot
function, the spillovers to entry cost remain substantial and those to sunk cost remain
relatively very small. We conclude from this robustness analysis that our broad nding of
large entry-cost spillovers and small sunk-cost spillovers is robust to all the variations that
we have tried in this sub-section. It is important to point out that the e¤ects of various
variations that we have tried are signicant on the size of spillovers. It is just that the broad
conclusions are not a¤ected by them.
7 Concluding Remarks
We model the entry and expansion of KFC and McDonalds in the Chinese fastfood market
as a dynamic game. We assume that the observed entry and expansion decisions are equi-
librium outcomes. This allows us to recover the structural parameters of the game without
solving for equilibrium. We use the estimated model to study the cost spillovers from the
rival.
Our estimates suggest substantial spillovers to the cost of entering a new city. For
example, if the rival is not present in the city in which the chain is entering and distance
from the nearest city where the rival is present decreases by 100 kilometers, the cost of entry
into the city decreases by 1.22 standard deviations for KFC and 1.52 standard deviations
for McDonalds. If the rival is already present in the city, a one unit increase in the number
of rivals outlets decreases the cost of entry by 0.59 standard deviations for McDonalds but
increases it by 1.49 standard deviations for KFC.
We also nd that the spillovers to the sunk cost of opening a new outlet are much smaller.
For example, a 10-unit increase in the rivals network density decreases the sunk cost by 0.03
standard deviations for KFC and increases it by 0.03 standard deviations for McDonalds.
Similary, the number of rivals outlets in the city also has a small e¤ect on the sunk cost: a
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one unit increase in the rivals number of outlets decreases the sunk cost by approximately
0.01 standard deviations for both KFC and McDonalds. Hence the expansion within a city
is not as much inuenced by the presence of the rival as is the entry into a new city.
The very large state space of our dynamic model is a mixed blessing. On one hand, a rich
set of state variables allows us to satisfy most of the equilibrium conditions during structural
estimation and also provides better understanding of the determinants of entry and sunk
costs. On the other hand, it makes the computation of equilibrium practically impossible
and hence we cannot do any counterfactual analysis. An interesting counterfactual could
have been to look at the entry and expansion of one of the two chains in the absence of the
other.
We pick the structural parameters that rationalize the data in the light of our model.
If the fastfood chains act according to a model that is radically di¤erent from ours, our
structural parameter estimates may not reect the true entry or sunk costs faced by the
chains. This is not a limitation of our paper alone, this is a limitation of structural estimation
in general: the structural estimates are as credible as the theory on which they are based.
We estimate the static prot functions using data from a small subset of cities. Future
work should expand this dataset to make the static prot function estimates more credible.
Also, we restrict our attention to the cost-side spillovers because of the lack of data on
the demand side. Future work should extend this research to include estimation of the
demand-side spillovers.
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Figure 1: Total outlets in China (by the end of the year) and their growth
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Figure 3: Changes in probabilities of McDonalds entry when one more KFC outlet is
present in the city
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Figure 4: A Comparison of the e¤ects of one more KFC outlet on McDonalds probabilities
of entry and expansion
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Table 1: Number of cities entered and outlets opened (by the end of the year)
KFC McDonalds
Year Cities Outlets Outlets/City Cities Outlets Outlets/City
1990 2 4 2:0 1 1 1:0
1995 21 75 3:6 11 69 6:3
2000 72 370 5:1 56 315 5:6
2005 198 1462 7:4 117 812 6:9
2007 230 1932 8:4 142 1012 7:1
Table 2: First mover
First Mover No. of Cities (%)
KFC 177 (75:0)
McDonalds 33 (14:0)
Both 26 (11:0)
Total 236 (100:0)
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Table 3: Frequency distribution of the number of outlets in a city (end of 2007)
No. of KFC McDonalds
Outlets No. of Cities (%) No. of Cities (%)
0 16 (6:5) 104 (42:3)
1 85 (34:6) 64 (26:0)
2 46 (18:7) 25 (10:2)
3 to 5 38 (15:4) 21 (8:5)
6 to 10 22 (8:9) 9 (3:7)
11 to 20 19 (7:7) 13 (5:3)
21 to 100 18 (7:3) 9 (3:7)
> 100 2 (0:8) 1 (0:4)
Total 246 (99:9)x 246 (100:1)x
xThe sum does not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Table 4: Frequency distributions of total and new outlets (Full sample: 246 cities, 18 years)
Number of Total Outlets 0 1 2 3-5 6-10 11-20 21-100 >100 Total
(at the start of the year)
KFC: Frequency 3; 168 535 220 207 134 94 61 9 4; 428
(Percent) (71:5) (12:1) (5:0) (4:7) (3:0) (2:1) (1:4) (0:2) (100:0)
McDonalds: Frequency 3; 638 364 102 128 80 62 50 4 4; 428
(Percent) (82:2) (8:2) (2:3) (2:9) (1:8) (1:4) (1:1) (0:1) (100:0)
Number of New Outlets 0 1 2 3-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 >30 Total
(opened during the year)
KFC: Frequency 3; 643 454 140 128 37 18 7 1 4; 428
(Percent) (82:3) (10:3) (3:2) (2:9) (0:8) (0:4) (0:2) (0:0) (100:1)x
McDonalds: Frequency 4; 018 225 70 75 30 9 1 0 4; 428
(Percent) (90:7) (5:1) (1:6) (1:7) (0:7) (0:2) (0:0) (0) (100:0)
xThe sum does not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable (units) Obs. Mean S.D p10 p90
Chain Characteristics (KFC)
Total outlets (number at the start of the period) 4428 1:8 8:8 0 3
New outlets (number per period) 4428 0:4 1:7 0 1
Distance from nearest own outlet (kilometer) 4428 327 442 0 972
Network density1 4428 10:8 24:0 0 29:2
Chain Characteristics (McDonalds)
Total outlets (number at the start of the period) 4428 1:2 6:3 0 1
New outlets (number per period) 4428 0:2 1:1 0 0
Distance from nearest own outlet (kilometer) 4428 647 1; 095 0 1; 517
Network density1 4428 7:9 18:6 0 21:8
City Characteristics
Pop. Density (thousand per sq. km.) 4263 1:21 1:12 0:23 2:55
GDP p.c. (2001 prices, thousand yuans) 4042 14:8 15:8 3:7 29:3
Note: 1Number of outlets within 300km radius around a city, weighted by the distance of each outlet
from the city.
Table 6: Annual operating income (2001 prices, million yuans)
KFC McDonalds
Per City
Mean 328:57 83:04
S. D. 489:83 141:36
Per Outlet
Mean 17:91 9:26
S. D. 20:29 5:44
Observations 84 170
42
Table 7: Static prot functions
KFC McDonalds
Specication in (3):
i0 17:234
 10:228
(S:E:) (1:567) (0:570)
ini  0:129  0:022
(0:017) (0:013)
inj  0:022  0:005
(0:023) (0:011)
iP 0:001
  5:46E-5
(0:000) (9:84E-5)
R2 0:901 0:893
Specication in (4):
if 4:524
 6:617
(S:E:) (1:490) (0:000)
iP=(ni+nj) 0:141
 0:019
(0:024) (0:005)
R2 0:861 0:886
Observations 84 170
Note: ,  and  denote signicance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: First-stage policies
KFC McDonalds
Variable Estimate (S:E:) Estimate (S:E:)
ni 0:100
 (0:029) 0:159 (0:036)
n2i  1:15E-3 (1:7E-4)  2:62E-3 (5:87E-4)
n3i 3:77E-6
 (6:06E-7) 1:82E-5 (5:64E-6)
nj 0:082
 (0:013) 0:065 (0:017)
nj  Ii  0:017 (0:282) 1:031 (0:170)
n2j  1:72E-3 (3:36E-4)  5:88E-4 (3:15E-4)
n2j  Ii 0:035 (0:095)  0:166 (0:032)
n3j 1:25E-5
 (3:08E-6) 3:17E-6 (1:06E-6)
n3j  Ii  0:002 (0:007) 0:007 (0:001)
ai 0:299
 (0:067) 0:198 (0:088)
ai  Ii  0:403 (0:042)  0:420 (0:063)
a2i  0:014 (0:003)  0:017 (0:004)
a2i  Ii 0:025 (0:002)  0:023 (0:004)
di  1:54E-3 (4:83E-4)  1:77E-3 (4:11E-4)
dj 2:77E-4 (1:32E-4)  1:14E-4 (6:43E-4)
dj  Ii  8:01E-4 (2:50E-4)  1:79E-3 (8:46E-4)
(nw)i 0:013
 (0:002)  0:002 (0:004)
(nw)i  Ii  0:010 (0:008) 0:029 (0:009)
(nw)j  0:013 (0:002)  0:001 (0:003)
(nw)j  Ii 0:013 (0:008)  0:014 (0:007)
Den 0:118 (0:032) 0:164 (0:077)
Den Ii 0:044 (0:061)  0:159 (0:098)
GDPpc 0:008 (0:002) 0:010 (0:005)
GDPpc Ii 0:016 (0:006) 0:016 (0:008)
ni  nj  2:51E-4 (2:98E-4)  6:88E-4 (5:53E-4)
ni  ai 0:002 (0:002)  7:22E-4 (0:003)
ni  (nw)i  3:66E-4 (8:54E-5) 3:93E-4 (1:90E-4)
ni Den  0:003 (0:004)  0:011 (0:009)
ni GDPpc  4:40E-5 ( 4:68E-5)  2:28E-4 (1:19E-4)
over-dispersion 2 (p-value) 92:45 (0:000) 196:73 (0:000)
R2 0:306 0:289
Observations 4040 4040
Note: ,  and  denote signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Structural parameter estimates
Parameters KFC McD
ei0 416:55 31:71

(S:E:) (1043:35) (17:88)
eiP=A 346:15
 18:11
(45:32) (2:72)
eiy 21:57
 1:07
(8:30) (0:35)
eiai 76:23  11:21
(118:24) (2:66)
eia2i
45:96 0:49
(7:62) (0:15)
eidi  3:01  0:21
(0:42) (0:02)
eidj  1:80  0:62
(0:29) (0:08)
einj  220:18 24:24
(36:88) (3:18)
ei  148:27 40:74
(66:99) (10:78)
si0  103:35  79:43
(21:88) (1:34)
siP=A 0:11 0:02
(0:39) (0:06)
siy 0:74
 0:004
(0:10) (0:005)
siai  2:78  0:54
(2:54) (0:13)
sia2i
0:03 0:005
(0:07) (0:004)
siwi  0:17 0:05
(0:05) (0:01)
siwj 0:07
  0:03
(0:05) (0:004)
sixi  1:35  0:72
(0:36) (0:08)
sini 1:60
 0:39
(0:11) (0:01)
sinj 0:20
 0:06
(0:09) (0:004)
si 22:78
  7:97
(12:99) (1:72)
% CS1 95:06 93:29
1% CS = Percentage of the equilibrium conditions satised
Note: ,  and  denote signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. Standard errors are bootstapped.
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Table 10: Spillovers
KFC McDonalds
Change in Entry Cost
Cause: (in units of SD)
100-kilometer decrease in rivals distance:  1:22  1:52
100-kilometer decrease in own distance:  2:03  0:51
One-unit increase in rivals outlets: 1:49  0:59
Change in Sunk Cost
Cause: (in units of SD)
10-unit increase in rivals network density:1  0:03 0:03
10-unit increase in own network density:1 0:07  0:06
One-unit increase in rivals outlets:  0:01  0:01
One-unit increase in own outlets:  0:07  0:05
110-unit increase is equal to 10 more outlets in the city or 20 more outlets in a city
150km away. See (1) for the exact denition of network density.
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A Data on Operating Income
We have compiled the data on operating income from a number of sources. The data for the years 2003-2005
are from Statistical Yearbook of China Restaurants (Issues 2004, 2005 and 2006). The data for years 2006
and 2007 are from Statistical Yearbook of China Chain Stores of Retail Trades and Catering Services (Issues
2007 and 2008). Instead of reporting a precise number for the operating income, the yearbooks report a
range. We take the average of the lower and upper limits of the range as our measure of operating income.
We expand our dataset by using information from the following online sources:
1. http://www.docin.com/p-69630763.html;
2. http://www.baiyan.cc/newsInfo.asp?typenumber=0002&id=106;
3. http://news.sohu.com/20060902/n245129062.shtml;
4. http://finance.qq.com/a/20090327/000223.htm;
5. http://www.canyin168.com/glyy/glzx/hyfx/201103/28410.html.
We convert the data into constant 2001 yuans by using the Consumers Price Index.
Our dataset on operating income primarily covers big cities. For example, in our full sample the average
number of outlets per city for the 2003-2007 period is 4.9 for KFC and 2.9 for McDonalds. If we restrict
the sample to cities for which we have data on operating income, the average number of outlets per city
becomes 21.3 for KFC and 9.3 for McDonalds. Consequently, the static prots that we estimate may not
be representative of the average prots in the entire country. One way to see this is to use country-level
sales gures for the two chains, assume a reasonable mark-up and compute country-level prots. We can
then compare them with the country-level prots implied by our estimates. According to The Wall Street
Journal (2013) Chinas fastfood sales were $47 billion in 2007. The market shares of KFC and McDonalds
were 6.5% and 2.3%, respectively. This leads to the sales of about $3.055 billion for KFC and $1.081 billion
for McDonalds. If one assumes a markup of 30% on cost, the implied prots are $0.705 billion for KFC
and $0.249 billion for McDonalds. We estimate average prot per outlet to be Y17.234 million for KFC
and Y10.228 million for McDonalds. The exchange rate between yuan and dollar was 7.5910 yuan per
dollar on July 2, 2007 (Source: www.nance.yahoo.com). Using this exchange rate our estimated average
prot per outlet works out to be $2.270 million for KFC and $1.347 million for McDonalds. These translate
into country-level estimated prots of $4.386 billion (= $2:270m  1932 outlets) for KFC and $1.363 billion
(= $1:347m  1012 outlets). These simple back-of-the-envelope calculations show that we might be over-
estimating the static prots by a factor of 6.2 (4:386=0:705) for KFC and by a factor of 5.5 (1:363=0:249)
for McDonalds. We discuss the implications of this over-estimation in Section 6.3.
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B Appendix Figures
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Figure B.1: Distance from the nearest city with at least one own outlet (KFC)
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C Appendix Tables
Table C.1: Discretization of the distance variable
State Range in the data (km) Discretized value
1 0 0
2 0 < d  50 25
3 50 < d  100 75
4 100 < d  150 125
5 150 < d  200 175
6 200 < d  300 250
7 300 < d  500 400
8 500 < d  1; 000 750
9 1; 000 < d  2; 000 1; 500
10 2; 000 < d  3; 000 2; 500
11 3; 000 < d  4; 000 3; 500
12 4; 000 < d  5; 000 4; 500
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Table C.2: Estimated transition matrix for GDP p.c. (thousand yuans)
CurrentnNext 0-4 4-8 8-12 12-16 16-20 20-30 30-50 >50
0-4 0:69 0:29 0:01 0:00
4-8 0:02 0:75 0:21 0:02 0:00 0:00 0:00
8-12 0:00 0:03 0:72 0:24 0:01 0:00 0:00
12-16 0:00 0:00 0:03 0:64 0:31 0:02
16-20 0:00 0:01 0:05 0:53 0:40 0:00 0:00
20-30 0:01 0:02 0:03 0:74 0:21
30-50 0:00 0:02 0:83 0:14
>50 0:05 0:95
Note: Row sums may not be equal to 1 due to rounding.
Table C.3: Estimated transition matrix for population (thousands)
CurrentnNext 0-250 250-500 500-750 750-1000 1000-1500 1500-2000 >2000
0-250 0:81 0:17 0:01 0:01
250-500 0:00 0:94 0:04 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:00
500-750 0:00 0:01 0:93 0:04 0:01 0:00 0:00
750-1000 0:00 0:01 0:94 0:04 0:00
1000-1500 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:94 0:04 0:01
1500-2000 0:01 0:01 0:93 0:04
>2000 0:00 1:00
Note: Row sums may not be equal to 1 due to rounding.
50
Table C.4: Estimated transition matrix for distance (KFC) in kilometers
tn(t+ 1) 0 0-50 50-100100-150150-200200-300300-500500-1K1K-2K2K-3K3K-4K4K-5K
0 1.00
0-50 0.21 0.79
50-100 0.17 0.03 0.80
100-150 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.75
150-200 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.73
200-300 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.71
300-500 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.78
500-1K 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.74
1K-2K 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.75
2K-3K 0.03 0.13 0.84
3K-4K 0.25 0.75
4K-5K 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.24 0.48 0.13 0.01
Note: Row sums may not be equal to 1 due to rounding.
Table C.5: Estimated transition matrix for distance (McDonalds) in kilometers
tn(t+ 1) 0 0-50 50-100100-150150-200200-300300-500500-1K1K-2K2K-3K3K-4K4K-5K
0 1.00
0-50 0.15 0.85
50-100 0.08 0.03 0.89
100-150 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.84
150-200 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.78
200-300 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.74
300-500 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.78
500-1K 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.76
1K-2K 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.23 0.68
2K-3K 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.62
3K-4K 0.08 0.15 0.77
4K-5K 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.24 0.48 0.13 0.01
Note: Row sums may not be equal to 1 due to rounding.
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Table C.6: Estimated transition matrix for network density (KFC)
tn(t+ 1) 0 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30-50 50-100 >100
0 0.87 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00
0-1 0.61 0.29 0.08 0.02
1-2 0.34 0.42 0.20 0.04
2-3 0.22 0.67 0.10
3-5 0.35 0.63 0.01
5-10 0.50 0.46 0.04 0.00
10-15 0.36 0.58 0.05
15-20 0.30 0.69 0.01
20-30 0.51 0.49
30-50 0.60 0.40
50-100 0.77 0.23
>100 1.00
Note: Row sums may not be equal to 1 due to rounding.
Table C.7: Estimated transition matrix for network density (McDonalds)
tn(t+ 1) 0 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30-50 50-100 >100
0 0.88 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00
0-1 0.60 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.01
1-2 0.36 0.31 0.22 0.11
2-3 0.29 0.57 0.13 0.01
3-5 0.43 0.51 0.04 0.01 0.00
5-10 0.68 0.28 0.02 0.01 0.01
10-15 0.59 0.36 0.04 0.01
15-20 0.55 0.45
20-30 0.62 0.38
30-50 0.73 0.27
50-100 0.88 0.12
>100 1.00
Note: Row sums may not be equal to 1 due to rounding.
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